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Es FEMA El Problema? Hurricane Maria and the
Slow Road to Recovery in Puerto Rico
By Clifford Villa
Legal Planet
May 17, 2018
Strolling west on Calle Loiza from the Ocean Park neighborhood of San Juan, Puerto
Rico, you could miss the devastation wrought by Hurricane Maria last
September. Here in early May 2018, runners and walkers lap the track at Parque
Barbosa while middle-aged men try to keep pace with younger guys on the sheltered
basketball court. And yet, a chunk of roof over that basketball court is missing and
half of the evacuation route sign nearby seems to have been ripped away by
winds. Further along Calle Loiza, window signs announce store re-openings (Abierto
Ya) and at night the bars and restaurants fill up and emit just enough glow to
navigate the uneven sidewalks outside. In the light of day, electricity here –
supposedly now reaching 98% of the island – seems improbable, with power poles
leaning grimly over streets and power lines dangling like a kelp forest over the
sidewalks. All of it seems waiting for the next hurricane – even a Category 1, even a
bit of extra wind and rain – to sigh and plunge the island back into darkness.
For a sense of how we got here, you can find solid reporting on Puerto Rico and
Hurricane Maria from the New York Times, Politico, or any number of real news
outlets. But here in San Juan, among the universal graffiti forms and the distinctive
toasters (yes, toasters) of street artist Bik Ismo, there is one bold answer stenciled on
the freeway overpass and tagged on the side of buildings along Calle Loiza: FEMA
ES EL PROBLEMA.

On my first day in San Juan, I was ready to believe it. Ten days later, after
conversations across the island and a view into the inner sanctum of the FEMA Joint
Field Office, I was compelled to reconsider.
Readers of this space may be informed by history and culture, accustomed to
conflict, attuned to nuance. And yet, don’t we, as lawyers and legal scholars, still
want someone to blame when things go wrong? Those of us who follow disasters
were only too happy to have “Heckuva Job Brownie,” the hapless FEMA
Administrator under George W. Bush, to blame for the Government’s anemic
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 gave
us British Petroleum and whining CEO Tony (“I Want My Life Back!”)
Hayward. Hurricane Harvey showcased Houston’s notorious rejection of land use
planning. So who gets the credit now, in post-Maria Puerto Rico, for the longest
blackout in U.S. history, for the unfathomable pain and suffering experienced by 3.4
million U.S. citizens for weeks and months on end, for the families left with a daily
challenge of finding safe drinking water, for the uncountable loss of life, and hope?
We could blame the President of course, distracted by a feud with the NFL for six
days after Maria made a Category 5 hit on Puerto Rico on September 20, 2017. We
could blame a ponderous Commonwealth government with 141 agencies and
overlapping authorities. We could blame the infamous corruption of local officials on
the island. We could blame an island culture that promoted infrastructure
construction over maintenance. We could blame economic misfortunes, poor
management, and crushing public debt of $74 billion followed by debilitating
austerity measures. We could blame all these things, while also pointing fingers at
FEMA, and many people on the island do.
Diana, my first Uber driver on the island, told me that FEMA required a $500
certification of damage to her apartment in order for her to receive $200 in
assistance for repairs. Brenda, Uber driver, 4th grade teacher, and new mom,
explained her frustration with FEMA like this: Imagine two cars with worn-out brakes
crashing into each other; FEMA will pay to repair the cars to their state before the
crash, complete with another set of worn-out brakes, thus ensuring the crash will
happen again.
The illogic made sense to me in a way. After all, it wasn’t FEMA’s job to go around
handing out new cars with new brakes. But at the same time, I wondered if the
analogy was true. Would FEMA really spend billions of dollars ($10 billion so far, with
another $49 billion anticipated) just to put Puerto Rico right back into as precarious
a position as existed before Maria? In fact, FEMA Administrator Brock Long,
appearing before Congress on March 15, 2018, testified to pretty much the
opposite. He stated:
… [T]hanks to action taken by Congress, FEMA has new
authorities given to us in the Bipartisan Budget Act of
2018…. For example, in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, FEMA may provide Public Assistance funding for

critical services to replace or restore systems to industry
standards without restrictions based on their pre-disaster
conditions.
If you review the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, you will find this new authority
buried in Section 20601 along with many other new provisions yet to be
discovered. So maybe Brenda’s car-brakes analogy was wrong, maybe FEMA indeed
recognized the illogic of which she complained. I imagine FEMA must have
advocated for the change in the law, and was now busy solving problems that few of
us could even comprehend. As an Uber driver, 4th grade teacher, and new mom,
Brenda could hardly be faulted for not reading the 250-page budget bill carefully.
People who do follow FEMA rules and changes include many committed and creative
lawyers on the island and mainland working for academic institutions and nonprofit
organizations. At the University of Puerto Rico School of Law, I met with law school
faculty, including Dean Vivian Neptune Rivera, and a host of attorneys engaged in
providing legal services to the survivors of Hurricane Maria. From attorneys on the
frontlines who provide direct legal services to individuals at FEMA Disaster Relief
Centers (DRC), I heard many thoughtful critiques of FEMA’s performance on the
Maria response.
Most of these critiques concerned FEMA funding for home repairs under the
Individuals and Households Program (IHP) of Stafford Act Section 408. There were
early complaints about FEMA assistance forms in English that could not be read or
understood by the Spanish-speaking residents of the island. There were complaints
about lack of training, with some FEMA inspectors making assessments of structural
integrity that were well beyond their area of expertise. Perhaps the most common
complaint concerned the meaning of an “owner-occupied” residence, complicated by
the loss of title documents in the hurricane and the even greater challenge of the
“informal” system of property ownership on the island, which may involve properties
handed down for generations without recorded documents. Encouragingly, each of
these complaints may already be finding solutions. For example, according to
Gabriela Camacho, one of the attorneys staffing the DRC, the problem of “informal”
ownership may be resolved through use of affidavits attesting to the history of
ownership and occupancy, with a model affidavit to be developed for a more
efficient process.
From the Disaster Relief Center in Canóvanas to the FEMA Joint Field Office (JFO) in
the San Juan suburb of Guaynabo takes about 45 minutes with traffic, but it feels a
world away. The JFO is central command for FEMA on the island. Housed in a
generic glass office building, the JFO inside is simply breathtaking: all movement
and energy, some 2,000 workers and work stations equipped with computers,
phones, and pump-bottles of hand sanitizer. Arranged like spokes in a wheel,
connected work tables spiral away from a central hub, supporting a massive
organization aligned along 12 sectors including Energy, Water, Housing, Education,
Transportation, and Natural & Cultural Resources.
Up a spiral staircase is the FEMA “C” suite, where I meet Tito Hernandez, Deputy
Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), the No. 2 guy in charge of a FEMA organization

with more than 4,000 people on the island today. Tito’s Executive Assistant
announces my arrival and our interview begins promptly as scheduled at 1:15 pm.
If you could dream up someone to lead a massive FEMA response to a major disaster
in Puerto Rico, what qualities would you want? Someone with depth of experience,
of course, maybe 210 prior deployments. Someone wicked smart, with a capacity for
numbers and details, but also a broad vision and dedication to the overall
mission. Someone able to acknowledge problems – and committed to solving
them. And in Puerto Rico, let’s get someone from Puerto Rico, someone who knows
both the language and the culture, and whose own family lives there, securing the
ultimate stake in the success of the mission. That person is Tito.
“This is the catastrophic disaster for FEMA,” he says, dispensing with chitchat. FEMA
is always preparing for the Cascadia Subduction Zone event, the 9.0 mega-quake in
the Pacific Northwest. FEMA plans for the next big hurricane along the Atlantic
Seaboard. But Maria was different, a non-CONUS event where nothing could be
trucked in and every airport and seaport was shut down on Day 1. And FEMA
resources were already stretched thin immediately following Hurricanes Harvey and
Irma. Tito sketches a map of the island, demonstrates wind speeds and direction as
Maria tore through the heart of the island. He rattles off stats: 18,000 personnel
deployed at the peak, 1.1 million meals served per day, 67 hospitals (all of them) shut
down initially, two mobile hospitals treating 40,000 patients, 140 helicopters making
over 1,000 food drops into remote locations, total FEMA commitment of $60 billion,
plus $18 billion from HUD, plus more from other agencies. Over the next five to ten
years, 1500 schools will be reduced to 750, reflecting reduced demands due to outmigration from the island. Old public housing will be closed, and both closed schools
and closed public housing will be returned to open space. The electrical grids will be
rebuilt with a mix of energy sources, including solar and wind (although both remain
vulnerable to high winds) and tidal power.
On FEMA assistance to private individuals (Stafford Act Sec. 408) and public entities
(Stafford Act Sec. 428), Tito is brimming with more big ideas. One of the most
frustrating elements of FEMA assistance to individuals is the statutory cap of
$25,000 (now $33,000) set by Stafford Act Sec. 428(h)(1). Imagine if your own
home was destroyed by a hurricane. How far would $33,000 get you towards
rebuilding? You would have insurance of course, but you may find it covers damage
only from wind and not water. However, taking a broad view of FEMA’s authority,
Tito talks about combining Sec. 428 funds with other funding programs, including
FEMA’s Shelter-In-Place program and the Permanent Housing Construction program,
potentially making available combined funds up to $125,000 per household. That
could make all the difference between a home and homelessness.
Before and after talking with Tito, I spoke with other senior FEMA officials about their
work on Maria. These are some hard-core field agents, people who gave up
permanent residences and simply live from one disaster deployment to the next, no
more than 51 weeks in any one place. Among these hardened troops, no one had
ever seen anything like Maria. Words like “horrific” from federal officials may not
instill comfort, but they were there to see it and I was not. Pursuing one more
lingering question, I finally asked why FEMA had not seen Maria coming and “pre-

positioned” resources on the island before it made landfall. The short answer: FEMA
did. In fact, FEMA had a contingent of people in a warehouse in San Juan on the day
Maria made landfall. The FEMA warehouse was breached by the hurricane winds and
rain, and had to be evacuated like so many other buildings across the island.
Seven months after landfall, talk of Maria on the island continues to stir strong
emotions. But one of those emotions is gratitude. Francisco and Illia, new friends in
Cabo Rojo on the other side of the island, talked of the FEMA teams in their hotel
every morning, planning out their 16-hour days, for days and weeks on end. My
Airbnb hosts in San Juan, Sol and her husband Gianluca, offered fairly the
same. Echoing comments from across the island, Sol spoke of Maria as a “blessing in
disguise” for Puerto Rico, the best chance she has seen for rebuilding both the
economy and infrastructure of the island. Anyone with means is buying their own
generator now and no one seems fixed on assigning blame for Maria. With June
already at hand next month, there is simply too much left to do to prepare for the
next hurricane season.
Es FEMA el problema? Quizás, pero también es una parte importante de la solución.
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